Introduction
The enterprise reform in China since the 1980s has actually been an exploration of establishing a suitable corporate governance mechanism. The process can be divided into two periods. In the 1980s, it was adapting aspects of the German and Japanese model; and from the 1990s, from the Anglo-American model. However, the Chinese system has inherited some of the disadvantages of these two models, such as the dominance by one major shareholder, the absence of employees in corporate management, and the lack of protection of the interests of creditors and local communities. This has caused the misbehavior of corporations. This chapter concludes by summarizing the lessons learned in China's corporate governance reform, and provides analysis of some of the new trends in the reform, such as the reforms in differentiated treatment of shares, and emphasis on the concept of harmonious society.
Nowadays, many Chinese listed companies have a very negative reputation. An important example is that the Chinese stock market is in a record-low downturn and is still going down. It seems that people have completely lost their trust and confi dence in it. For many years, small and medium shareholders could not enjoy even the basic privileges and benefi ts of the stock market and, moreover, suffered big losses in their investments. Moreover, Chinese companies and enterprises also have a bad reputation in the domestic labor market, and legal action against employers is always in evidence. It is not only generally about low salaries, poor working conditions and lack of respect for employees' dignity, but also quite often about worker layoffs. The reputation of Chinese companies is also very bad in terms of society and the environment -the misspending of natural resources, the destruction of the environment, ignorance of enterprises' responsibility towards society, for example. All of these have resulted not only in broad condemnation by the public, but also in many massive public demonstrations taking place which have affected the stability and harmony of the society.
Since the early 1980s, China has been carrying out reforms of its stateowned enterprises. The reform process has been a hard one, evolving from loosening the control of management power to the separation of management and ownership powers, and then to building a modern enterprise system. It has gone from learning from the German experiences of corporate governance by employees in the 1980s, to learning from the American experiences in developing stock markets and introducing the system of independent directors, and so on, in the 1990s. Why have enterprises retained such bad reputations while Chinese economic development has generally achieved great success? What will be the future for Chinese enterprises in corporate governance reform? This chapter will attempt to provide some analysis by referring to China's efforts in introducing the Western models of corporate governance.
The two major models of the corporate governance mechanism
The corporate governance mechanism is an organizational arrangement for the corporation itself. Through this organizational arrangement, it serves the interests of investors in the company (Mayer, 1997) . The contents of the corporate governance mechanism include a series of corporate governance systems, such as a board of directors, a supervisory board, the employees' role, and directors' incentives. In modern societies, and in the form of legislative intervention, different countries establish their corporate governance mechanisms based on different backgrounds.
The necessity of state intervention in corporate governance is a conclusion reached by Berle and Means (1932) in their research. According to them, a corporate governance system derives from the separation of ownership from control in modern stock companies under a market economy. In modern stock companies, investors who possess ownership of the company do not directly operate the company like they used to. Rather, they hire professional managers as their representatives and make them responsible for the company's operation. Under this model of "separation of powers," the interests of investors and managers are likely
